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TOWARDS A UNITED KINGDOM 
BILL OF RIGHTSt 
Francis G. Jacobs* 
The United Kingdom has no fundamental constitutional in-
strument. It is in that respect almost unique. Instead it has a 
fundamental constitutional doctrine: the doctrine of the sover-
eignty of Parliament. The first paradox of the United Kingdom 
constitution is that no rules have a constitutional status. 
The doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty entails that all the 
constitutional rules that, in other countries, would be set out in 
a constitution are, in the United Kingdom, contained in Acts of 
Parliament-or in the common law, or in unwritten constitu-
tional conventions or custom; and that any such rules, whether 
statutory or not, can be repealed or amended by an ordinary Act 
of Parliament, with no special procedure and no special majority 
being required. No provisions have constitutional status; still 
less are any provisions entre.nched. There is no "fundamental 
law." 
Yet the notion of fundamental law was deeply rooted in Eng-
land and, as Corwin showed in his classic survey,1 inspired much 
constitutional thinking in the United States. It was the Revolu-
tion of 1688, establishing the supremacy of Parliament over the 
Crown, which made it politically impossible for the courts to re-
view Acts of Parliament. Political continuity and stability since 
1688 have obviated the need for any new constitutional settle-
ment. In France a century later the Revolution made judicial re-
view politically impossible and that legacy has remained. Indeed, 
judicial review of legislation is generally a rare and recent devel-
opment throughout Europe. 
Although now composed of three principal jurisdictions or 
"law districts," namely England and Wales, Scotland, and 
Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom remains a unitary State, 
with for almost all purposes a single final court .of appeal, the 
House of Lords. Any mention of the House of Lords as the final 
t Thomas M. Cooley Lecture delivered at the University of Michigan Law School on 
Nov. 2, 1983. 
* Professor of European Law, University of London. 
l. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 
HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928). 
29 
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court of appeal recalls that other familiar paradox, that the 
United Kingdom is, politically, to some extent, a unitary State, 
never entirely embracing the separation of powers which a 
French observer found in the English Constitution2 and which 
became the basis of the United States Constitution. 
The formal and rigid separation of the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches of the state has, in any event, had very 
different consequences in different settings: in France, it has 
been taken, for nearly 200 years, to preclude the development of 
the judicial review of legislation, while in the United States, for 
almost as long, it has largely been accepted as requiring it. In 
the United Kingdom the convention was established only in the 
last century that the House of Lords, sitting in a judicial capac-
ity, should be composed exclusively of judges. Even today the 
Lord Chancellor can and frequently does sit, personifying, as a 
leading member of both the legislature and the executive, the 
rejection of the principle of the separation of powers. 
Apart from such colourful anomalies, the most significant as-
pect of the rejection of the separation of powers is the predomi-
nance of Parliament, founded on a further paradox. The country 
which can claim to be the home of the idea of fundamental law 
now has as the cardinal principle of its unwritten constitu-
tion-a principle incompatible with a normal constitution, in-
deed almost the negation of the very idea of a constitution-the 
principle of the sovereignty of Parliament. This Parliament is 
not a legislature constrained by a system of checks and balances 
with the executive branch. Given the predominance of the 
House of Commons, the system of Cabinet Government, and the 
extent of party discipline, resulting in the executive exercising 
control over the legislature, parliamentary sovereignty reflects 
the sovereignty not of the legislature but of an executive periodi-
cally answerable to the electorate, a system eloquently described 
by the present Lord Chancellor as at least potentially an "elec-
tive dictatorship."3 
Parliamentary sovereignty means simply, in concrete terms, 
that since the eighteenth century no court has claimed jurisdic-
tion to review an Act of Parliament. Cracks in the monolithic 
structure of the constitution have appeared only where some 
quasi-federal element appears to threaten the unitary character 
of the constitution. 
A first example is the reverberations of apparently entrenched 
2. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Book XI. 
3. LORD HAILSHAM, THE ELECTIVE DICTATORSHIP (Dimbleby Lecture 1976). 
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clauses-and by entrenched I mean protected against amend-
ment by subsequent legislation-in the Treaty of Union between 
England and Scotland• that in 1707 effected the union of the 
two countries and of their parliaments. As a Scottish court noted 
thirty years ago, 11 there were some clauses in that Treaty of 
Union which "expressly reserve to the Parliament of Great Brit-
ain powers of subsequent modification, and other clauses which 
either contain no such power or emphatically exclude subse-
quent alteration by declaration that the provision shall be fun-
damental and unalterable in all time coming."6 But the court in 
effect decided that no court exists, either in Scotland or in Eng-
land, with jurisdiction to declare ineffective any conflicting 
legislation. 
Similarly the Union with Ireland Act 18007 presents appar-
ently entrenched clauses. I take this less well known example 
from a lecture by Lord Kilbrandon, chairman of the recent 
Royal Commission on the Constitution.8 (Yes, the Constitution 
has been recognised to the extent of having a Royal Commission 
to sit on it, although, as is commonly the case, very little has 
been done to implement its recommendations. 9) 
Sec. I of the Union with Ireland Act 1800 provides that 
"the said foregoing Articles are hereby declared to be the 
Articles of Union of Great Britain and Ireland and the 
same shall be in full force and have effect forever." Brave 
words. Now let us look at the fate of one of the Articles. 
It was enacted by Article 5 "that the Churches of Eng-
land and Ireland as now by law established be united 
into one Protestant Episcopal Church to be called the 
United Church of England and Ireland and that the Doc-
trine Worship Discipline and Government of the said 
United Church shall be and shall remain in full force for 
ever, and that this be deemed and taken to be an essen-
tial and fundamental part of the Union." The main part 
of this Article suffered painless and unlamented extinc-
tion at the hands of the Statute Law Revision Act 1953.10 
"So much," as the chairman of the Royal Commission on the 
4. 5 Anne, ch. 8. 
5. MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 Sess. Cas. 396 (Scot. 1st Div.). 
6. Id. at 411. 
7. 40 Geo. 3, ch. 67. 
8. LORD KILBRANDON, A BACKGROUND TO CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1975). 
9. ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION, 1969-1973, REPORT (1973). 
10. LORD KILBRANDON, supra note 8, at 16. 
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Constitution succinctly put it, "for entrenched clauses."11 Would 
an enacted Bill of Rights suffer a similar fate? 
The third example comes from a more recent move towards a 
union, the accession of the United Kingdom to the European 
Communities in 1973. The preamble to the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community recites that the founding 
member States were "determined to lay the foundations of an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."12 While some 
measure of economic integration has been achieved, the goal of 
political union remains at least as remote as ever, yet economic 
centralisation and the transfer of power to the Community insti-
tutions have had a perceptible impact on political and legal sov-
ereignty. Indeed, it is now open to argument whether, in the 
developing field CQvered by Community law, parliamentary sov-
ereignty any longer constitutes the basic norm of the United 
Kingdom constitution.13 
In the field of individual rights, the historic guarantees of 
Magna Carta, 14 of the Petition of Right, 111 and of the Bill of 
Rights 1689, 16 although still invoked occasionally by the courts, 
have no constitutional status. Those historic documents may be, 
and indeed to a considerable extent have been, repealed by sub-
sequent Acts of Parliament. 
The United Kingdom is a party to modern international bills 
of rights: the European Convention on Human Rights,17 the Eu-
ropean Social Charter,18 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 19 and the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights. 20 The status of these bills of rights 
remains precarious. One consequence of parliamentary sover-
eignty is that treaties ratified by the United Kingdom but not 
incorporated do not have the force of law. Although the rights 
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are, by 
their very nature ideally suited to be enforced in the domestic 
11. Id. 
12. Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
13. See, e.g., Trindade, Parliamentary sovereignty and the primacy of European 
Community law, 35 Moo. L. REV. 375 (1972); Winterton, The British Grundnorm: Par-
liamentary supremacy re-examined, 92 LAW Q. REV. 591 (1972). 
14. 9 Hen. 3, chs. 1-37. 
15. 3 Car., ch. 1. 
16. 1 W. & M. (Sess. 2), ch. 2. 
17. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
18. Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89. 
19. Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
20. Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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courts, those instruments, in contrast to the Treaty of Rome, 
have not been incorporated or given legislative effect, and so do 
not have the force of law in the United Kingdom. This "dualist" 
approach to treaties, while it can be given a democratic rational-
isation, is perhaps the mark of an insular rather than an interna-
tionalist view of the law. It is true that, where a statute allows 
for more than one interpretation, the courts profess to adopt, as 
a rule of interpretation, that meaning which "is consonant with 
the treaty obligations."21 (Courts support the approach with the 
theory that they are giving effect to the intention of Parliament, 
since Parliament can be presumed not to have intended to legis-
late inconsi!;ltently with a treaty obligation. But the theory can, I 
shall suggest, be exposed as a legal fiction.) Nevertheless, that 
rule of interpretation has, at least until very recently, had little 
effect in relation to the European Convention. Instead, the 
courts, accustomed to very detailed and elaborate legislation, 
have said that the Convention provisions are "too vague," "too 
general," "not the kind of thing we are accustomed to."22 The 
result is that, while the courts will resist statutory encroach-
ments on the fundamental rights protected by the common law, 
they are less disposed to give effect to the Convention. 
The common law remains, therefore, the principal safeguard 
of individual rights in the United Kingdom, but the common law 
too must yield to the express terms of an Act of Parliament. 
Historically, it could reasonably be argued that the fundamental 
rights of United Kingdom citizens were more effectively pro-
tected by the common law than they were in other systems by 
codes, catalogues of rights, or legislation. But the fact that the 
United Kingdom is now the first client in Strasbourg23 suggests 
that the position has changed. Several factors may have caused 
this change. First, other systems may construe fundamental 
rights more broadly and define permissible limitations more 
strictly now than they are construed and defined in England. 
Second, ever-growing encroachments of the legislature and the 
executive create new threats to human rights. Third, the English 
courts are less ready to develop new remedies to meet those 
threats. 
The right of peaceful assembly, the right to freedom of associ-
21. Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, (1967] 2 Q.B. 116, 143 (C.A. 
1966) (Diplock, L.J.). 
22. Ostreicher v. Secretary of State for the Environment, (1978] 1 All E.R. 591 (Q.B. 
1977), aff'd, (1978) 1 W.L.R. 810 (C.A.). 
23. In recent years, more applications have been brought against the United King-
dom than any other State. See CouNCIL OF EUROPE Doc. DH (83) 6. 
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ation, the right to freedom of the press, the presumption against 
retroactive penal legislation, the presumption that legislation 
does not intend to take property without compensation, all these 
rights (recognised, incidentally, by the European Convention) 
are protected in England only by the common law, which re-
mains subject to any statutory inroads. Sufficiently explicit legis-
lation can abrogate any of these rights. Similarly, the right to 
freedom of the person and the famous remedy of habeas corpus 
originated in the common law, but habeas corpus is now largely 
regulated by statute and the right to freedom of the person can 
at any time be abridged by statute. For example, the Police and 
Evidence Bill24 proposed to increase from twenty-four hours to 
in some cases thirty-six and in exceptional cases ninety-six hours 
the period during which a person can be detained without 
charge. No common law rights are immune from Parliament. 
Against that background the scene shifts-or rather the cam-
era pans back-to Europe.' In recent years, United Kingdom law 
and institutions have a new dimension, the European dimension. 
Constitutionally and legally, the United Kingdom is now for the 
first time part of a Western European polity. Lord Justice 
Scarman recognised this development in his far-sighted lectures 
English Law-the New Dimension in 1974, the starting point of 
the recent debate on the adoption of a Bill of Rights in the 
United Kingdom.u That European dimension has two aspects: 
the European Community, which the United Kingdom joined in 
1973, and the European Convention on Human Rights, now be-
ginning to have a profound impact on the United Kingdom. The 
European Communities Act 1972 gives effect to European Com-
munity law in the United Kingdom, however, while the Conven-
tion remains in a legal limbo. 
Yet the United Kingdom Government participated actively in 
the drafting of the Convention, was one of the original signato-
24. Now the Police and Evidence Act 1984. 
25. L. ScARMAN, ENGLISH LAW-THE NEW DIMENSION (1974). For the continuation of 
the debate, see M. ZANDER, A BILL OF RIGHTS? (1975); P. WALLINGTON & J. McBRIDE, 
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND A BILL OF RIGHTS (1976); HOME DEPARTMENT, LEGISLATION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (1976); 
STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
BY LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND 64-74 (1977); Fawcett, A Bill of Rights for the United 
Kingdom?, 1 HuM. RTs. REv. 57 (1976); Brown, A Bill of Rights for the United King-
dom?, 58 THE PARLIAMENTARIAN 79 (1977); Mann, Britain's Bill of Rights, 94 LAW Q. 
REV. 512 (1978); N. ANDERSON, LIBERTY, LAW AND JUSTICE (1978); Do WE NEED A BILL OF 
RIGHTS? (C. Campbell ed. 1980); Riedel, 'J'he Bill of Rights Fallacy, in IN MEMORIAM 
J.D.B. MITCHELL 38 (1983). For earlier discussion, see Mann, The United Kingdom's Bill 
of Rights, 122 NEw L.J. 289 (1972); Black, Is There Already a British Bill of Rights?, 89 
LAW Q. REV. 173 (1973). 
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ries in 1950, and was the first state to ratify the Convention in 
1951. The Convention served as a model for the constitutions 
that the United Kingdom drew up for its colonies when they at-
tained independence, as the Constitution of Nigeria and there-
after the independence constitutions of many Commonwealth 
countries demonstrate. (I do not refer here to the United States 
in 1776.) With the understandable exception of the Federal Re-
public of Germany, the United Kingdom was the first of the big 
European countries to take the then bold step in 1966 of ac-
cepting the competence of the Commission and the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court. But it has never legislated to give ef-
fect to the Convention in the United Kingdom. For some years, 
such inactivity could be viewed indulgently. The Convention, af-
ter all, guaranteed only certain elementary rights which were ad-
equately protected by the common law, with its centuries of in-
dividualistic and libertarian tradition.26 The Convention was an 
export model, with left-hand drive, suitable for the European 
continent and perhaps for the former colonies. 
Such complacency should have had some limits even at the 
outset. For instance, the right to privacy, protected by Article 8 
of the Convention, provides one example of a right that has 
never been protected adequately by the common law or by stat-
ute, as the recent case of Malone well shows.27 With the develop-
ment of the case-law of the European Commission and Court of 
Human Rights, however, the contention that incorporation is 
unnecessary becomes increasingly hard to sustain. Time and 
again, in recent years, changes have been made in English law 
and practice to comply with opinions of the Commission and 
judgments of the Court: changes in the prison rules; in immigra-
tion procedures; in legislation on contempt of court; on mental 
health; on trade unions; on homosexual relations; on corporal 
punishment in schools.28 In at least some of these cases, legisla-
tion might not have been necessary and the cases might not 
have reached Strasbourg if the Convention had been given legis-
lative force in the United Kingdom. Other cases might have 
been resolved in accord with the Convention, even without in-
corporation, if the courts and the authorities had taken full ac-
count of their obligations under the Convention when applying 
26. Cf. THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF 13 SEPTEMBER 1966 TO THE RE-
QUEST OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 57 
OF THE CONVENTION, CouNCIL OF EUROPE Doc. H (69) 9, Second Addendum. 
27. Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No. 2), 1979 Ch. 344. 
28. For some examples, see A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVEN-
TION IN DOMESTIC LAW 186-87 (1983). 
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domestic legislation. 
Admittedly, the United Kingdom is not by any means unique 
in its failure to adopt legislation to give effect to the Convention. 
The Convention has the status of domestic law in only two-
thirds of the twenty-one states party to the Convention. The 
seven parties where the Convention does not have the status of 
domestic law are the four Scandinavian countries (Denmark, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden), Ireland, Malta and the United 
Kingdom.29 
Perhaps this political reality influenced the European Court of 
Human Rights to hold, despite strong evidence to the contrary 
in the Convention's negotiating history, that the Convention it-
self imposes no obligation to incorporate the Convention into 
domestic law. Article 1 of the Convention provides that "the 
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention," but in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom30 the 
Court was prepared to hold only that: 
[B]y substituting the words "shall secure" for the words 
"undertake to secure" in the text of Article 1, the draft-
ers of the Convention also intended to make it clear that 
the rights and freedoms set out in Section I would be di-
rectly secured to anyone within the jurisdiction of the 
Contracting States. That intention finds a particularly 
faithful reflection in those instances where the Conven-
tion has been incorporated into domestic law.31 
Yet, as I shall try to demonstrate, to be fully effective, imple-
mentation of the Convention does require some form of 
incorporation. 
In recent years, and notably since the Scarman lectures of 
197 4, 32 there has been a growing interest in the idea of giving 
statutory force to the Convention. Each of the main political 
parties has at various times expressed approval of the idea. A 
succession of bills to incorporate the Convention has been intro-
duced in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. One 
such bill successfully completed all the steps in the House of 
Lords and led to the appointment of a Select Committee to in-
vestigate the question. Only the narrowest majority of the di-
29. For a full survey, see A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 28. 
30. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 25 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights). 
31. Id. at 103 (footnotes omitted). 
32. L. ScARMAN, supra note 25. 
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vided Committee favoured adoption of a Bill of Rights, although 
it was unanimous in the view that, if there were to be a Bill of 
Rights, it should be based on the European Convention.33 The 
bill34 which passed through the House of Lords made no head-
way in the Commons, the Government of the day being unwill-
ing to make government time available to consider the bill. 
Within the past ten years, however, without formal incorpora-
tion, the Convention has taken faltering steps towards judicial 
recognition. An English court first invoked the Convention in 
1974.36 There it merely reinforced the presumption that criminal 
legislation does not have retroactive effect. Since then, the atti-
tudes of the judges toward the Convention have been divided 
and ambivalent in a variety of contexts, notably immigration 
cases.36 The judicial dicta reveal this division and ambivalence. 
For example, Lord Denning, having once expressed the view that 
immigration officers should take account of the Convention in 
applying the immigration rules,37 subsequently recanted and 
stated that because immigration officers had a difficult enough 
task "they cannot be expected to know or to apply the Conven-
tion. They must go simply by the immigration rules laid down 
by the Secretary of State and not by the Convention. "38 The 
full, chequered story of judicial recognition is an unhappy one. 
Every step forward by one judge is echoed by a judge who disso-
ciates himself from that step. 39 
Has the time not come for the courts to adopt a more robust 
approach in place of this delicate two-step? My thesis is that the 
courts could, without the need for any further legislation, and 
should, without greatly departing from existing principles, go far 
beyond their timid advances and embrace the Convention 
33. HOUSE OF LORDS, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON A BILL OF RIGHTS 39-40 
(1978). For a different view, see J. JACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF RIGHTS 277-81 (1980). 
34. L. Wade, Introducing a Bill of Rights, in Do WE NEED A BILL OF RIGHTS?, supra 
note 25, at 17. Previous attempts to introduce legislation had been made in 1970 and 
1975. See J. JACONELLI, supra note 33, at 32, 259-61. 
35. Waddington v. Miah, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 683 (H.L.). 
36. Compare Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Phansopkar, 
1976 Q.B. 606, 626 (C.A. 1975) (Scarman, L.J.) (affirming that courts have a duty to 
resolve ambiguities or omissions to give effect to or not derogate the Convention) with 
Regina v. Chief Immigration Officer ex parte Salamat Bibi, [1976] 3 All E.R. 843, 847 
(C.A.) (Denning, M.R.) (affirming that the Convention is not a part of English law be-
cause not incorporated by legislative action). 
37. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Bhajan Singh, 1976 
Q.B. 198, 207 (C.A. 1975) (Denning, M.R.). 
38. Regina v. Chief Immigration Officer ex parte Salamat Bibi, [1976] 3 All E.R. 843, 
847 (C.A.) (Denning, M.R.). 
39. See Duffy, English law and the European Convention on Human Rights, 29 
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 585 (1980). 
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whole-heartedly, even if they cannot give the Convention the 
special status accorded to Community law by the European 
Communities Act. 
Among the principal reasons for taking this view is a very re-
cent but very compelling one, the emergence in recent years of a 
coherent and systematic body of case-law developed by the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights. A series of judgments in the 
past three or four years is particularly striking. The Court, after 
a cautious early approach, adopted a dynamic view of the Con-
vention, taking a broad and flexible attitude to the rights guar-
anteed and a systematically restrictive interpretation of the 
Convention's limitations clauses. If such statements were uncon-
vincing before, domestic courts should now often find it impossi-
ble to say that the provisions of the Convention are "vague" or 
too imprecise to be of assistance. The Convention is, in this re-
spect, unlike any other treaty to which the United Kingdom is a 
party. Under international law, it falls to the states which are 
parties to an agreement, in the absence of a procedure for judi-
cial settlement, to interpret their treaty obligations for them-
selves. Where the judicial process is available, however, indepen-
dent and authoritative interpretation of the court must prevail 
over the unilateral view of each State. This principle also makes 
possible an evolving interpretation of the treaty, an interpreta-
tion that accords with current conditions. The interpretation of 
the Community Treaties by the Court of Justice suggests itself 
as a parallel, the only similar case. But the resemblance ends, for 
the United Kingdom, in the fact that the European Communi-
ties Act grants statutory force to the decisions of the Court of 
Justice.40 No such statutory provision exists for decisions of the 
Court of Human Rights. The Convention is thus unique. 
It is not possible, I think, to argue that the Court of Human 
Rights does not give an "authentic" interpretation of the Con-
vention I?ut merely rules on whether the State concerned has in-
fringed the Convention. Admittedly, the Court's decisions have 
no automatic "direct effect" within the domestic legal systems; 
this is true even in those countries where the Convention forms 
part of domestic law.41 Such decisions also do not constitute a 
40. European Communities Act 1972, § 3(1): 
For the purpose of all legal proceedings any question as to the meaning or effect 
of any of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning and effect of any Commu-
nity instrument, shall be treated as a question of law (and, if not referred to the 
European Court, be for determination as such in accordance with the principles 
laid down by and any relevant decision of the European Court). 
41. See A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 28, at 260-61. See generally Bossuyt, The 
FALL 1984] United Kingdom Bill of Rights 39 
form of "judicial review" in the usual sense. The Court does not 
normally pronounce directly on the compatibility of a municipal 
law with the Convention; still less could it declare such a law 
invalid. The Court, at least in cases originating in applications 
by individuals, decides whether the rights of the individual, as 
enunciated in the Convention, have been infringed. 
But of course the Court's rulings on the interpretation of the 
Convention do have force beyond the confines of the instant 
case. Often they demonstrate that a particular statutory provi-
sion, not directly in issue before it, does violate the Convention. 
The state courts may often conclude correctly that continued 
application of the provisions in the prior fashion will inevitably 
lead to a finding of a violation of the Convention. Is it not then 
their duty to avoid applying those provisions? 
Yet, in the present state of English judicial attitudes, this view 
must have its limits. Even where the Court's judgment clearly 
found a United Kingdom statute inconsistent with the Conven-
tion, no English court would accept the argument that it should 
not apply that statute; the court would feel bound to wait until 
Parliament had amended or repealed the statute. Nonetheless, 
several factors should compel English courts to strive to give ef-
fect to the Convention. First, under international law, a decision 
contrary to the Convention would be an immediate violation. 
This provides a further argument for saying that faithful com-
pliance with the Convention may require giving direct effect to 
its provisions, as interpreted by the Court. Second, European 
Community law provides a parallel. The Court of Justice has 
adopted, in the Simmenthal case, the federal doctrine that a 
state court must set aside, and refuse to apply, any provision of 
State law which conflicts with Community law.42 (English courts, 
when confronted with that issue, may one day accept the Sim-
menthal doctrine.) Third, at least in those countries where the 
Convention is part of domestic law, it is possible to argue that 
the courts may not apply domestic legislation so as to be incon-
sistent with the judgments of the Court. Fourth, the English 
courts, if they cannot fly in the face of an Act of Parliament, 
must do their best to reconcile its terms with the United King-
dom's international obligations. If the courts persist in applying 
an Act in circumstances which are likely to lead to an adverse 
Direct Applicability of International Instruments on Human Rights, 15 REVUE BELGE 
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 317, 323-25 (1980) (discussing the effects of a decision by the 
European Court of Human Rights that the Convention supercedes conflicting national 
laws). 
42. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 629. 
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ruling by the Court of Human Rights, then they engage the in-
ternational responsibility of the United Kingdom. 
In practice, courts may avoid conflict between United King-
dom statutes and the Court's rulings if the English judges are 
prepared to apply legislation in the light of judgments of the 
Court. The case of Attorney-General u. British Broadcasting 
Corporation,43 where the question of contempt of court arose af-
ter the Court had given judgment in the Sunday Times44 case, 
but before the United Kingdom legislation had been amended 
by the Contempt of Court Act 1981, presented such an opportu-
nity. In Attorney-General u. British Broadcasting Corporation, 
Lord Fraser acknowledged that the courts should give considera-
tion to the provisions of the Convention and to decisions of the 
Court of Human Rights in cases where the domestic law is not 
firmly settled·.411 Lord Scarman appeared to go further, implying 
that, even when a decision of the House of Lords had estab-
lished English law, the House should be prepared to reconsider 
its decision in the light of the Convention and Court decisions 
applying the Convention.46 
Very recently the English courts have once again shown a 
more positive, yet still hesitant, attitude towards the Conven-
tion. Several recent House of Lords decisions on freedom of ex-
pression exemplify the new tendency. Attorney-General u. Brit-
ish Broadcasting Corporation is one example. The Lemon case47 
in 1979, the first prosecution for blasphemous libel in more than 
fifty years, also demonstrates this new tendency. Mrs. Mary 
Whitehouse, a well-known self-appointed custodian of public 
morality, brought a private suit against the editor of Gay News 
who published a poem describing homosexual acts performed on 
the body of the crucified Christ. The common law offence of 
blasphemous libel has an uncertain scope. The House of Lords 
addressed the specific question of whether the prosecution had 
to prove an intent to blaspheme or only an intent to publish 
material that was blasphemous. Lord Scarman, among the ma-
jority of three to two, relying on the European Convention, con-
sidered that an intent to publish was sufficient.48 Freedom of re-
ligion, in his view, outweighed freedom of expression. Lord 
Diplock, on the other hand, without expressly adverting to the 
43. 1981 A.C. 303 (H.L.). 
44. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 245 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1979). 
45. 1981 A.C. 303, 352 (1980) (H.L.) (Lord Fraser). 
46. Id. at 354 (Lord Scarman). 
47. Regina v. Lemon, 1979 A.C. 617 (H.L.). 
48. Id. at 665 (Lord Scarman). 
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Convention, considered that the majority view would, in effect, 
make blasphemy an offence of strict liability and that such a 
retrograde step could not be justified by any considerations of 
public policy.49 
A few months later, Lord Diplock took a similar view, this 
time expressly relying on the Convention, in a case of defama-
tory libel again arising out of a private prosecution. Gleaves v. 
Deakin, 60 which concerned evidence given before a magistrate 
about the bad reputation of the prosecutor, led the courts to 
consider the rule of English criminal law that the truth of the 
defamatory statement is not a defence to a charge of defamatory 
libel. Lord Diplock could find no justification for the rule in the 
Convention. He suggested that in order to 
avoid the risk of our failing to comply with our interna-
tional obligations under the European Convention, . . . 
the consent of the Attorney-General [should be required 
before a] prosecution for criminal libel [is instituted, and 
that in] deciding whether to grant his consent in the par-
ticular case, the Attorney-General could then consider 
whether the prosecution was necessary on any of the 
grounds specified in Article 10.2 of the Convention and 
unless satisfied that it was, he should refuse his 
consent.61 
If the courts suggest that the discretion to prosecute should 
not be exercised in such a case, it seems a short step to say that, 
if there is a prosecution, the courts should not convict. This re-
calls Professor Weiler's point that one effect of a Bill of Rights 
may be to transfer an issue from the area of prosecutor's discre-
tion to the area of judicial review. 62 
Perhaps the most significant recent case concerning English 
courts' treatment of the Convention is Malone v. Commissioner 
of Police of the Metropolis (No. 2) in 1979.63 Malone, a dealer in 
antiques, was charged with handling stolen property. During his 
trial, prosecuting counsel admitted that the police had tapped 
his telephone with the authorisation of the Home Secretary, to 
obtain evidence against him. In proceedings against the police 
49. Id. at 635-39 (Lord Diplock). 
50. 1980 A.C. 477 (H.L. 1979). 
51. Id. at 482 (Lord Diplock). 
52. Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New Canadian Version, 18 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 51, 72-73 (1984). 
53. 1979 Ch. 344. 
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challenging the legality of the police practice Malone relied on 
Article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees the right to re-
spect for private life and correspondence. Because English law 
provides no general right of privacy, the judge's reaction ac-
quires particular significance. He stated at the outset of a very 
careful discussion of the relation of the Convention and English 
law54 that he was prepared to take account of the Convention 
and of the interpretation adopted by the Court of Human 
Rights in the Klass case,55 in which the Court had stated that 
such interception of communications was permissible only if ac-
companied by stringent legal safeguards. In Malone the English 
court acknowledged that if a question of statutory construction 
existed, the court would readily seek to construe the legislation 
in a way that would give effect to, rather than frustrate, the 
Convention. But in the absence of any legislation, it could not 
give effect to the Convention. "Any regulation of so complex a 
matter as telephone tapping is essentially a matter for Parlia-
ment, not the courts; and neither the convention nor the Klass 
case can, I think, play any proper part in deciding the issue 
before me. "56 
This judgment contains a number of striking features. First, 
Malone presents the clearest recognition that English law is not 
in accordance with the Convention. Not only was there no gen-
eral protection of privacy under English law; it was clear to the 
court, from the Klass case, that the Court of Human Rights 
would find that English law violated the Convention. 
[I]t is impossible to read the judgment in the Klass case 
without it becoming abundantly clear that a system 
which has no legal safeguards whatever has small chance 
of satisfying the requirements of that court, whatever ad-
ministrative provisions there may be [and that it is] im-
possible to see how English law could be said to satisfy 
the requirements of the Convention, as interpreted in the 
Klass case .... 57 
The Malone opinion effectively torpedoes the view, if it was ever 
tenable, that incorporation of the Convention is unnecessary be-
cause English law already gives the Convention full effect. Not 
54. Id. ai 366. 
55. Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 E.H.R.R. 214 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 
1978). 
56. Malone, 1979 Ch. at 380. 
57. Id. at 379-80. 
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surprisingly, the case has now been referred to the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
Second, the case provides an interesting indication, of some 
general importance, of why the traditional common law ap-
proach to the protection of civil liberties is no longer adequate. 
That approach is based on the idea that anything which is not 
prohibited is permitted; therefore, no need exists for any instru-
ment expressly conferring individual rights. (This idea contrasts 
with the approach of less favoured countries in which everything 
not expressly permitted is prohibited.) Yet the Malone case 
stands the principle on its head. Because everything is permitted 
except that which is expressly prohibited, telephone tapping is 
not unlawful. 
Third, a curious paradox follows from the failure to incorpo-
rate the Convention; a matter regulated by English law can be 
treated in accordance with the Convention, while in the absence 
of any relevant domestic law the Convention cannot be invoked 
at all. This paradox appears in the judge's approach in Malone. 
The judge states that he will give the Convention due considera-
tion in discussing English law on the point, yet when he comes 
to the point and finds no English law, he considers himself una-
ble to apply the Convention. 
English judges, however, no longer always regard the absence 
of legislation as a reason for not intervening. The House of 
Lords has experienced a fundamental change of attitude over 
the past twenty years. The 1960's witnessed a legal as well as a 
social turning point in England. As the study of The Law Lords 
by Alan Paterson, 58 based on an extensive series of interviews, 
documents in fascinating detail, "for the first time the Law 
Lords as a body began to discuss judicial law-making and policy 
issues openly in a series of cases."59 Concomitantly, fundamental 
changes were made in the judicial law-making functions: the rule 
that the House of Lords was bound by its own decisions was 
within limits overturned; a more purposive approach was 
adopted to legislation and even to treaties; and, in particular, 
the fact that Parliament had not legislated was removed as a 
reason for judges to maintain the status quo. The argument 
from parliamentary inactivity found favour with few of the Law 
Lords interviewed as a reason for judicial restraint. Lord Den-
ning replied with characteristic candour: 
58. A. PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS (1982). 
59. Id. at 154. 
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Well, we use it when it suits our book. I use it if I 
don't want it altered, but, on the other hand if it doesn't 
suit our book, I can say, "Oh, well, Parliament can't no-
tice everything and doesn't notice everything and they 
haven't got time to do it."60 
Certainly, Parliamentary inactivity has many causes other 
than satisfaction with the existing law; this points to a fourth 
lesson from the Malone case. Ordinary legislation constitutes an 
inadequate substitute for a Bill of Rights because Parliament 
will legislate only under extreme pressure. As a leading authority 
on the subject, Professor Harry Street, has said in this context, 
"the Englishman who is the victim of abuse of this tapping 
power remains without remedy in English courts. Not until the 
European Court forces a change ... is a United Kingdom Gov-
ernment likely to improve his lot."61 And again in the same con-
text, Professor Street has commented that "one of the dominant 
characteristics of British Governments is that they resist any le-
gal restrictions on the exercise of their powers: at all costs they 
will do no more than make ex gratia concessions of no legal ef-
fect."62 Yet the courts' new approach points the way to a new 
approach to the Convention. The absence of legislation giving 
effect to the Convention could, with an additional but limited 
stretch of the judicial imagination, be discounted as a reason for 
disregarding its provisions. The judges could fill the legislative 
lacuna. 
Another new strand in the argument derives from the complex 
interrelationship between English law, the Convention, and Eu-
ropean Community law. While European Community law has 
and the Convention has not been given the force of statutory law 
in the United Kingdom, the Convention does have a certain sta-
tus in European Community law. The Court of Justice of the 
European Communities has increasingly, over the past ten years, 
acknowledged that the principle of respect for fundamental 
rights forms part of the general principles of law that must be 
observed in the application of Community law.63 These general 
principles include such fundamental axioms as the principles of 
non-discrimination and proportionality, as well as respect for in-
dividual rights. In relation to individual rights, however, the 
60. Id. at 181. 
61. H. STREET, FREEDOM, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE LAW 52 (5th ed. 1982). 
62. Id. at 53. 
63. See Mendelson, The European Court of Justice and Human Rights, 1 Y.B. EUR. 
L. 125; A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 28, at 229-59. 
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Convention, together with constitutional principles of the mem-
ber States, serve merely as material sources of those general 
principles. The Convention would be a formal source of Commu-
nity law only if the Court were to take the further step of hold-
ing that the Convention binds the Community or if the Commu-
nity itself were to accede to the Convention, as has been 
officially proposed.64 And even if the Convention were to become 
part of Community law and thereby become capable of being 
invoked in the English courts, it could be invoked only in rela-
tion to Community measures and not in relation to English law 
at large. 
But the argument does not stop there. Because the Court re-
lies on the Convention as evidence of the general principles of 
law, the courts of the member States can already rely on the 
Convention in the same capacity when the state authorities ap-
ply a Community provision. They, therefore, must consider the 
Convention. Whatever the status of the Convention in English 
law, the English courts are not only permitted, but are required, 
to consider it if it should be relevant to an issue of Community 
law. They must interpret Community measures as would the 
Court of Justice.65 Here, again, the picture has changed. The 
Convention has become a source of a supranational European 
law and as such has some application in the legal systems of all 
the member States of the Community. 
It is difficult to see why there should not be some spillover 
from the general principles of law into other areas outside the 
field of Community legislation. Why should English courts adopt 
one approach in reviewing the conduct of public authorities 
where the authorities are applying Community law and a differ-
ent approach where the same authorities, in a related field, are 
applying domestic legislation? Immigration officers must apply 
the Community rules on free movement in accordance with the 
Convention: why not also the domestic rules? Even in the short 
term such judicial schizophrenia seems unsatisfactory. In the 
longer term, just as the courts in the past adopted the rules of 
customary international law, and a common commercial law, the 
courts may also recognise the emergence of European customary 
64. The proposal by the Commission of the European Communities that the Commu-
nity should accede to the Convention was published in Memorandum of Apr. 4, 1979, 
BULL. EUR. COl\_1M. (Supp. 1979-80) (No. 2/79). See HousE OF LORDS, SELECT COMMITTEE 
ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS (1979-80 H.L. 362); McBride & Brown, 
The United Kingdom, the European Community and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, l Y.B. EuR. L. 167, 176-92 (F. Jacobs ed. 1981). 
65. European Communities Act 1972, § 3(1). See supra note 40. 
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law, a common core of general principles of general application. 
European Community law supports the application of the 
Convention in three further ways. First, the history of applica-
tion of European Community law helps to dispose of the argu-
ment that the provisions of the Convention are too general and 
too vague to be enforceable. The provisions of the Community 
Treaties are also often framed in a very general way. For exam-
ple, the EEC Treaty provisions on competition, Articles 85 and 
86, the common market anti-trust law, present such broad provi-
sions. Article 86 prohibits any abuse of a dominant position in a 
substantial part of the common market. Although the examples 
of abuse listed in Article 86 and the case-law of the Court of 
Justice create some specificity, the basic concepts remain re-
markably porous and open-textured. Yet the courts enforce the 
prohibition of Article 86, and do so in cases requiring both find-
ings on complex questions of fact and an evaluation of problem-
atical economic issues, which may tax the courts more seriously 
than the application of the Convention in cases of fundamental 
rights. Generality is no longer an excuse. 
Second, ten years' experience in the handling of Community 
law demonstrates that Parliamentary sovereignty is not the 
stumbling-block it might, and did, seem. The courts, untroubled 
by theoretical constitutional issues, have accustomed themselves 
to the primacy of Community law. Only if an Act of Parliament 
expressly purported to override Community law would that diffi-
culty be real; although such an eventuality cannot be excluded 
altogether, it is perhaps even less likely that an express overrid-
ing of the Convention would prove necessary. 
Third, the Community Treaties constitute the only European 
example, apart from the Convention, of procedures for interna-
tional judicial determination of the rights of individuals against 
states. Because the very object and purpose of the Convention, 
in comparison with the Community Treaties, is to accord the in-
dividual enforceable rights, there can be no warrant for giving 
less effect to the Convention than to the Community Treaties. 
The existence of judicial interpretation also assists in dispos-
ing of the argument that the courts, in interpreting an Act of 
Parliament consistently with the Convention, are doing no more 
than giving effect to the intention of Parliament. That argu-
ment, designed to reconcile the international obligations of the 
United Kingdom with the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, 
is when applied to the Convention exposed as a fiction. Taken 
strictly, the argument would be difficult to apply to Acts of Par-
liament enacted before ratification of the Convention, because it 
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is difficult to contend that Parliament did not then intend to 
legislate inconsistently with the Convention.66 But it becomes 
impossible to reconcile with an evolving interpretation of the 
Convention by the Court of Human Rights. The true explana-
tion must be found in the principle, also correct under interna-
tional law, that all organs of the State, the courts as well as the 
legislature, are bound by treaty obligations. And in the special 
case of the Convention, the obligations are to be interpreted in 
accordance with the judgments of the Court. 
If Parliament decided to adopt a Bill of Rights-and here it 
must be said that a decision is not much closer than it was ten 
years ago-should it be the Convention or a tailor-made Bill, 
more suited to domestic conditions, perhaps even fuller and 
more up-to-date than the Convention? In my view, a number of 
arguments, individually strong and cumulatively overwhelming, 
support the adoption of the Convention as the text of a United 
Kingdom Bill of Rights.67 Some of the arguments also demon-
strate that incorporation of the Convention would overcome ob-
stacles which would otherwise attend the adoption of a Bill of 
Rights. 
First, legal obligation compels at least partial incorporation of 
the Convention. Courts cannot now give full effect to the United 
Kingdom's Convention obligations without some form of incor-
poration of that text. 
Second, there is the weighty practical consideration that the 
Convention commands a wide measure of cross-party support. It 
would be difficult if not impossible to achieve a similar measure 
of consensus on a new Bill of Rights. The difficulties of drafting 
a new Bill of Rights can hardly be overstated. The exercise 
would open up a veritable Pandora's box of political controversy, 
which could take years to resolve, with no certainty of a success-
ful outcome. 
Third, a new Bill of Rights would raise problems of overlap-
ping provisions. The coexistence of a new Bill of Rights, directly 
enforceable, and an indirectly enforceable Convention would be 
a recipe for confusion, if not chaos. 
Fourth, there is the European dimension: incorporation of the 
Convention would achieve the adoption of a common European 
standard at a stroke of the legislative pen. 
66. See Duffy, English Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, 29 
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 585, 591-93 (1980). 
67. I note, but do not find convincing, Jaconelli's objections to adoption of the Con-
vention. See J. JACONELLI, supra note 33, at 277-81. 
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Fifth, a new Bill of Rights would deprive the courts of the 
guidance of the Strasbourg case-law. Experience shows that the 
courts would have genuine difficulties in coping with constitu-
tional style provisions. If, on the other hand, the Bill of Rights 
were drafted in greater detail, in a style to which the courts are 
accustomed, it would lose the advantages of flexibility, adapta-
bility and permanence, and would perhaps encourage a narrow 
approach to its interpretation. One leading advocate of a Bill of 
Rights, Anthony Lester, has warned that it might take years to 
persuade the courts not to approach a Bill of Rights in the same 
way they approach a taxing statute.68 Such a danger is obviated, 
in the case of the Convention, by the availability of the Stras-
bourg case law. 
Sixth, and perhaps of greatest importance, the Convention 
would provide the required balance between Parliament and the 
courts and go far to resolve the central dilemma which is the 
principal theme of the debate: the role of judicial review in a 
democratic society. The overt intrusion of the courts into poli-
tics, and the spectre of political appointments of judges, raise 
particular difficulties in the United Kingdom. The Convention 
has successfully maintained the balance between the effective 
protection of human rights and the preservation of political con-
sensus. Its acceptability in so many European democracies 
would both reassure those who genuinely regard any dilution of 
Parliamentary sovereignty as undemocratic and also provide a 
measure of protection for the courts. It would minimize what in 
the United Kingdom may be seen to be the greatest risks at-
tendant on the introduction of a Bill of Rights: the twin dangers 
of judicial interference in the political process and the possibil-
ity of political interference with the independence of the 
judiciary. 
But I have sought to suggest that, even without legislation and 
quite apart from any general arguments about the desirability of 
adopting a Bill of Rights, the United Kingdom courts can and 
should currently give full effect to the Convention. This may not 
be an entirely satisfactory alternative to formal incorporation of 
the Convention by Act of Parliament. Such incorporation could 
put the Convention on a firmer legal basis; it would have a valu-
able declaratory and promotional effect; and it might even, by 
68. A. Lester, DEMOCRACY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (1969) (Fabian Tract No. 390), 
cited in J. JACONELLI, supra note 33, at 178. For the most recent contribution to the 
debate, see Lester, Fundamental Rights: The United Kingdom Isolated?, 1984 PuB. L. 
46. 
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analogy with the European Communities Act, give the Conven-
tion some special status without formal entrenchment. 
It has to be accepted that full entrenchment is not at present 
a realistic option. Full entrenchment would be difficult without a 
wholly new. constitutional settlement, which is normally a re-
sponse to political crisis and renovation, as is underscored by the 
examples of the United States, Caneda, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and indeed by the Magna Carta and the 1689 Bill of 
Rights. In the United Kingdom today, however, the customary 
lack of interest in our constitutional arrangements, and even less 
interest in constitutional theory, remains pervasive. Addition-
ally, no widespread view exists that fundamental rights are inad-
equately protected. Every society has its blind spots; and in the 
United Kingdom there is a blindness to all issues of constitu-
tional principle, the product, no doubt-for it was not always 
so-of a long period of political stability and the absence of dis-
satisfaction with the existing level of protection of human rights. 
But entrenchment of a Bill of Rights may not be a pressing 
need, even if the present state of the law is recognised as unsat-
isfactory. Even incorporation of the Convention by ordinary leg-
islation, although desirable, need not be treated as indispensa-
ble. The courts could do much to fill the legislative gap and to 
give effect to the Convention: by construing other legislation re-
strictively; by following the example of the Court of Human 
Rights in giving fundamental rights a broad interpretation and 
scrutinizing rigorously the justification for all restrictions; by ap-
plying the principles of necessity and proportionality; by devel-
oping judicial remedies even in the absence of legislation; and by 
drawing attention forcefully to what may prove to be the rare 
cases where an Act of Parliament by its terms leaves them no 
choice but to ignore the Convention. . 
It is striking to look back ten years to a time when the Con-
vention was almost unknown in the United Kingdom and had 
never been cited in a judicial decision. In the past decade, the 
interpretation of the Convention has made great advances and a 
substantial European law of human rights has developed. Will 
the next decade see similar advances? By giving effect, de facto, 
to the Convention, the United Kingdom courts could bring the 
United Kingdom into step with other European countries, with 
many Commonwealth countries, and with other democratic soci-
eties committed to the effective protection of human rights. The 
courts could develop, over the forthcoming years, on the basis of 
the Convention, a new Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom. 

